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ACTIVITIES OF ARBITRAGEURS
IN TENDER OFFERS *
FREDEmi B. HENR± t
Both the Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934' and the prospectus requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 2 seek to provide the shareholders of the target corporation with
sufficient information about the acquiring corporation's takeover bid to
enable them to decide rationally whether to tender their shares. But
many target shareholders never make this informed choice, largely be-
cause no amount of disclosure can inform them of the likelihood that the
tender offer will be successful, and thus whether the shares they are
willing to tender will be accepted in whole or in part.3 Rather than face
this choice, many target shareholders sell on the open market. The
buyer will probably be an arbitrageur, the professional trader who often
decides the outcome of the tender offer by his initial decision to buy
target shares and his subsequent disposition of the acquired shares. It
has been estimated that arbitrageurs may be responsible for up to 90
percent ' of the trading activity in the two securities involved in an
uncontested exchange offer and that over 50 percent ' of all tenders come
through arbitrageurs. This Article examines the mechanics and func-
tions of arbitrage in tender offers and some of the regulatory problems
that may arise.
* This Article was prepared in a Workshop in Securities Regulation conducted
by Professors Robert H. Mundheim and Morris Mendelsohn of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School respectively, and financed by the
Brookings Institution. Much of the factual material was developed in conversations
with Robert E. Rubin, partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co.
t B.A. 1967, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1970, University of Pennsylvania. Member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
'.15 U.S.C. §§78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. V, 1970), anending 15 U.S.C.
§§78m, 78n (1964).
215 U.S.C. §§77e(b), 77j(a) (1964).
3 Although the Williams Act is intended to uphold the investor's belief in the
integrity and openness of the market, see Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
18, 190 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 510], critics have pointed out
that the Act fails to provide the most important piece of information that a target
shareholder needs: some basis upon which to estimate the likelihood that the takeover
will succeed. See Brundey, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUGERs
L. REv. 609, 615 n.16, 617-18 (1967).
4 Huge Profits Out of Tiny Margins, Bus. W=i, May 28, 1966, at 116 [here-
inafter cited as Huge Profits].
5 O'Boyle, Changing Tactics in Tender Offers, 25 Bus. LAW. 863, 866 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as O'Boyle]. The percentage includes both cash tender and
exchange offers.
It should be noted that few assertions about arbitrage can be made with any
certainty. Because of the well-known secretiveness of arbitrageurs, Huge Profits
116, most descriptions of their activities are based on estimates and speculations.
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I. MECHANICS OF ARBITRAGE
Arbitrage involves the buying of a security at one price and the
simultaneous or nearly simultaneous selling of its equivalent at a higher
price usually in the same market. A security has as its equivalent any
other security into which it is convertible or exchangeable.' For ex-
ample, convertible debentures and stock rights issued by a corporation
have as their equivalents the corporation's common stock for which they
may be exchanged.
In the case of convertible debentures, arbitrage may occur when the
debentures are selling at a price lower than the equivalent amount of
common stock. The arbitrageur will buy the bonds and sell the stock,
making a profit equal to the price differential. For example, if a
debenture selling at 1200 is convertible into 40 shares of common stock
selling at 30Y2, the arbitrageur can buy a debenture and sell the
equivalent amount of common stock (40 shares), making a gross profit
of 20 dollars per bond.' If he does not own enough shares of the
common to cover the sale, he will sell short' and use the common stock
received on conversion of the debenture to cover his short position.
The mechanics of arbitrage in an exchange offer are similar. The
arbitrageur will buy target shares and sell short an equivalent amount
of the offeror's stock.9 At the end of the offer, he will exchange the
shares of the target which he has accumulated and cover his short
position with the shares received in the exchange. His profit will be the
price differential between the two securities. Cash tender offers, on
the other hand, do not present an opportunity for arbitrage in the
classic sense. Because there is no equivalent security to be sold at the
time of purchase, no profit can be made from an existing price discrep-
ancy between a security and its equivalent." The arbitrageur is, how-
ever, quite active in cash offers because the acquiring corporation
usually offers a cash premium above market for target shares, thus
providing an alternative-and profitable-equivalent. He will buy
target shares in the open market and tender them for cash on the
6 M. EVANS, ARBITRAGE IN DOMESTIC SECURITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 21-22
(1965) [hereinafter cited as EVANS]; see TwENTiETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY
MARKErs 249-51 (1935).
7 EVANS 25.
8 "Selling short" usually denotes a trader's instructions to his broker to sell
stock which he does not own but believes will decline. The broker borrows the stock
and delivers it to the purchaser. The money value of the borrowed shares is
deposited by the broker with the lender. The trader must then "cover" his short
position by purchasing the same number of shares he borrowed and giving them to
the lender. If the trader initially sold the shares for more than he must pay to
"cover," his profit is the difference between the prices.
9If the stock offered consists of a new class of securities, the arbitrageur will
sell the offered securities on a "when issued" basis.
l0 EvANs 21-22.
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closing date. If he buys target shares before the price has reacted
significantly to the news of the offer, he profits by the price differential
between his cost and the offer specified by the acquiring corporation.
The major difference between arbitrage in tender offers and
arbitrage in convertible debentures, rights, or warrants is the element
of risk." The latter type of arbitrage is simultaneous and riskless.'
In the tender offer context, however, the arbitrageur accumulates a long
position in the target's stock, some or all of which may not be accepted
by the offeror, and a short position in the offeror's stock which he may
have difficulty covering. The arbitrageur must maintain both positions
for a relatively long period of time; he cannot cover immediately by
exercising the conversion privilege as he can when performing riskless
arbitrage in convertible securities because the tender offer must remain
open until the specified closing date.' 3 Substantial risks are created for
the arbitrageur if the target firm's management engages in defensive
measures designed to block the takeover. 4 Such measures create the
risk that the offer will not be consummated, and therefore that the
arbitrageur may have difficulty covering his short position profitably.
Even if the defensive tactics fail to block the takeover, the delay and
uncertainty created may convince the arbitrageur that his capital can be
more profitably invested elsewhere.' 5 Of the many defensive measures,
perhaps the target's publicity campaign least affects the arbitrageur.
This tactic may even play into his hands by creating doubt and con-
fusion in the shareholder's mind. To avoid the difficult task of assessing
the competing claims of the target and the offeror, the shareholder may
simply sell in the open market. By contrast, tactics creating positive
obstacles to the completion of the tender offer seriously threaten the
arbitrageur's potential profit. Private or government antitrust suits are
most effective because the delay inherent in such litigation allows the
target's management to marshal additional defense maneuvers and
casts the chilling shadow of unlawful motives upon the acquiring cor-
poration's efforts.'" Other factors making arbitrageurs hesitant are the
publication of adverse earnings reports or other internal corporate prob-
11 "'Risk' here does not mean the calculated risk taken in a 'delayed' arbitrage.
On the contrary, it means 'risk' in the sense that forces beyond the control of the
arbitrager can intervene adversely." Id. 37.
12 Id. 38.
i 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) (Supp. V, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964);
see Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. IEv. 377, 388-89 (1969).
14 See generally Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23
Bus. LAW. 115 (1967) ; Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Manage-
ments in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969).
18 This may, in itself, be a victory for the target company, because the loss of
arbitrage operations can substantially reduce the chance of a successful takeover.
10 Comment, Eurodollar Financing of Cash Tender Offers: A New Challenge to
the Margin Requirements, 118 U. PA. L. Rv. 767, 792 n.153 (1970).
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lems. Naturally, all of these risks are inherent to a lesser degree even
in friendly mergers and unopposed exchange offers.' 7  Finally, even
assuming that the tender offer is successful, if the published bid is for
less than the total number of shares outstanding, all of the shares ten-
dered by the arbitrageur may not be taken up."" The arbitrageur is then
forced to liquidate his long and short positions in the open market.
Arbitrageurs generally consider exchange offers riskier than cash
offers. The registration of newly issued shares in an exchange offer
eliminates any element of surprise and lengthens the period of time be-
tween the initial announcement of the offer and the specified termination
date. The time involved in the registration process increases the
vulnerability of the exchange offer.'" The SEC examines the trans-
action in detail; the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department may
decide to take action; shareholders may bring suits; and the target's
defensive plans may be more fully implemented. By contrast, cash
tender offers do not require registration statements and the consequent
time for processing. Thus it is less likely that events which could
hinder a takeover will occur. For the arbitrageur, then, cash offers
present fewer complications than do exchange offers.20
In both cash and exchange offers the arbitrageur assumes the
risk that the takeover attempt will fail. 1 The price differential in a
cash bid and the spread in market values in a stock for stock offer
continue during the early stages of the offer because of this un-
certainty. Consequently, the arbitrageur's profits on transactions
effected early in the offer may be great. As the termination date
approaches and various hurdles (tax rulings, shareholder objections,
antitrust difficulties) are cleared, the risk is reduced and the price
spread narrows,' reflecting the arbitrageur's increased willingness to
establish larger positions. Although his profits per share on trans-
actions undertaken at the narrower spread are smaller, he may trade
in large volumes, thus making the overall transaction highly profitable.
Because the arbitrageur's profit is in large measure bound to the
success of the acquiring corporation, he may not arbitrage or will do
11' EvALNs 37; Levy, Arbitrage, Convertible Bonds and the Investor, 194 Com. &
FmAx. CHRONCcLE 278 (1961).
IsTo the extent that an offer is for "any and all" shares tendered, the arbi-
trageur's risk is reduced.
19 Cf. EvANs 37-38.
20 The arbitrageur's preference for the cash offer seems to be at odds with
findings that exchange offers have a greater likelihood of success. A study of all
tender offers between 1956 and 1967 showed that the chances of defeating a cash
offer were 1 in 3, while the chances of defeating an exchange offer were 1 in 6.
See Austin & Fishman, The Tender Take Over, MERGERs & AcQuIsiTIoNs, May-
June 1969, at 13-14.
21A Feast for the Arbitrageurs, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 165 [hereinafter cited
as Feast for the Arbitrageurs].
22 Id.
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so only to a limited extent if he believes the offer will fail. If, after
an arbitrageur has established a position, it appears to him that the
offer will be unsuccessful, he will take his profits by liquidating his
long and short positions in the open market.' If a sufficient number
of arbitrageurs follow this course, the price spread between the stock
of the target and the offeror will be maintained. The prices may
stabilize at a relatively large spread; if enough arbitrageurs pull out
fast enough, the price differential will increase.
The price action of the two stocks is thus a good indicator of what
professionals believe to be the chances of the takeover's success. If
arbitrageurs believe the offer will be successful, their trading will
cause the price of the target company's stock to rise and that of the
offeror to fall. As long as they remain in the market, the prices will
continue to move slowly together until on the last day of the offer
the spread may be negligible. Stable price movements and the gradual
narrowing of the spread may thus indicate that arbitrageurs are
dominating the market in the two securities.
If arbitrageurs are hesitant, the spread will remain large. One
example of a conspicuously wide price spread occurred in the proposed
Xerox-CIT merger.' The well-known professional skepticism for this
merger was manifested in the large spread, reflecting the arbitrageurs'
unwillingness to commit capital to the deal.'4  The proposed Memorex-
Technicolor merger provides a more recent example. Public indica-
tions were that the merger would go through as planned. Nevertheless,
in spite of assurances from Memorex's president that there were no
problems, the spread remained large until the day before the merger
was to be consummated. The merger was cancelled just before the
deadline,"8 substantiating the professionals' skepticism. This incident
suggests that arbitrageurs may have access to nonpublic information
concerning the progress of an offer.
Arbitrage also tends to stabilize the relationship between the
prices of both stocks." By the very nature of his investments the
2
3Huge Profits 116.
24 Morgello, The Xerox-CIT Merger Story, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1968, at 85.
25 Arbitrageurs claim they were never tempted to move into the Xerox-C.I.T.
situation, although the spread was often as wide as 36 percent, because, as
one of them put it, the statements by the two companies showed they "hadn't
done enough work" on the merger to prove they were in earnest.
Fea.st for the Arbitrageurs 166. Arbitrageurs were similarly hesitant in the early
stages of the proposed merger of White Consolidated Industries and White Motor
Corporation. See Abele, Market Place: Traders Carefd on White Deal, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1970, at 50, col. 5.
28 N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1969, at 37, col. 3.
27 In economic terms, arbitrage "tends . . . to balance differences in the supply
and demand, as signified by disparity in prices . . . . The arbitrageur buys the
surplus in one market to supply a demand in another. As a result, prices in various
markets tend to be equalized." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra note 6, at 250-51.
ARBITRAGEURS IN TENDER OFFERS
arbitrageur "attempts . . . to isolate himself from the vicissitudes
of the market. His strategy is to capture the spread between two . . .
securities." 2 Once he has established his position, the arbitrageur is
unconcerned with the general condition of the market or any speculative
price movements of either security so long as the prices of the two
securities continue to move together over the long run.
Once the arbitrageur commits himself to an offer he will generally
maintain his positions, gradually increasing his long and short positions
over the course of the offer. The arbitrageur will, however, occa-
sionally exert a counterbalancing force on the steadily narrowing price
movements by partially reversing his positions. An arbitrageur may
do this if the spread narrows below the "required spread" -the nar-
rowest spread within which he believes he can profitably operate. 9
When the actual spread is greater than this "required spread," he will
continue to arbitrage and narrow the spread. If the spread becomes
too narrow, the arbitrageur can reverse his positions and take his
profits. As the target stock rises in price, many arbitrageurs will be
unable to resist this temptation. There will thus be a counter pressure
on the prices. Arbitrageurs probably only engage in this practice to a
limited extent-to the extent that it is possible to cover their short
position in the open market without difficulty. Their primary interest,
of course, is to see the offer successfully completed and to tender their
accumulated shares of the target so that they can cover their short
position in the offeror.
II. THE FUNCTION OF ARBITRAGE
The arbitrageur provides a market for those shareholders of the
target corporation who for various reasons desire to sell their shares.30
Target shareholders may wish to sell on the open market because of
the red tape involved in tendering or because, as noted earlier, they are
unwilling to gamble on the outcome of the offer." Although a target
shareholder may receive sufficient information to assess the merits of
a proposed takeover, he may still be uncertain whether to tender his
shares because he cannot predict what his investment position will
be after all the shares are counted. If the offeror requires that a
minimum number of shares be tendered before he is required to accept
any shares, the target shareholder is uncertain whether his shares will
28 Feast for the Arbitrageurs 165.
29 EVANs 40-41.
30 That many shareholders of target corporations sell on the open market is
readily apparent: as noted above, text accompanying note 5 supra, 50% of all tenders
may come from arbitrageurs-people acquiring their holdings through purchases on
the open market.
31 See note 3 supra & accompanying text; Hearings on S. 510, at 38-39, 207.
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be accepted. Even if the takeover is successful, if the offer specifies a
maximum number of shares to be accepted, the Williams Act requires
that when more than the specified number of shares are tendered in the
first ten days, the shares must be accepted on a pro rata basis.32 Thus
an investor may decide to tender his holdings in the target company
but discover later that only a fraction of them have been taken up.3
After the mandatory ten day pro rata period, if an offer is on a first-
come-first-served basis, investors will not know when enough shares
have been tendered to fulfill the offeror's maximum. To avoid such
uncertainties, many shareholders may be tempted to sell in the open
market where an ascertainable gain on a definite number of shares
is assured.34
Prior to 1968, institutional investors avoided the risk that not all
tendered shares would be taken up by engaging in the practice of
"short tendering." I Because most exchange offers provided that
certificates representing the tendered shares need not be delivered until
after the expiration of the offer, funds and arbitrageurs would tender
more shares than they actually owned, thereby insuring that their total
block could be accepted by the offeror. But because this practice was
thought to give professionals an unwarranted advantage over the
amateur,36 the SEC promulgated rule 10b-4 declaring short tendering
3215 U.S.C. §78n(d)(6) (Supp. V, 1970), amending 15 U.S.C. §78n (1964);
see Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462, 509 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Bromberg].
3 3 If for any reason only some of a shareholder's stock is taken up in a cash
tender offer, and the offer is followed by a reorganization within the meaning of
INT. Riv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1), the shareholder may suffer adverse tax con-
sequences. If the merger occurs shortly after the tender offer, the offer and merger
may be deemed one transaction for tax purposes. Target shareholders selling
only part of their holdings to the offeror will be viewed as having received both
offeror stock and cash (boot). Under id., § 356(a) (2), such a shareholder may be
required to treat the gain realized on the tender offer transaction as ordinary income
rather than as a capital gain. See Possible traps for shareholders in tender offers,
28 J. TAX. 256 (1968) ; Interesting use of private ruling in tender offer, 28 J. TAX.
319 (1968). See generally B. BiTTER & J. EusTicE, INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 588-95 (2d ed. 1966). To avoid this possibility, the share-
holder may seek to assure capital gains treatment by selling on the market.
34 See Hearings on S. 510, at 209; Bromberg 529; Kelly, Some Observations on
Contested Takeover Bids, 15 N.Y.L.F. 619, 626-29 (1969). In exchange offers,
additional reasons may arise for selling rather than tendering. Target shareholders
are being asked to accept a new investment rather than cash in exchange for their
shares. If the offered shares have not been traded on the exchange, they lack the
seasoning to give a substantial basis for price comparison, and even if they have
been exposed to the market for a long period, the offered shares may simply not
comply with the general investment objectives of target shareholders.
s 5See TEXAS GuLF SULPHUR-INSIDER DIsCmosuRE PROaLEmIs 427-28 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as INsDER DiscLosuRa PROmLms] ; Bromberg 529; O'Boyle 865.
36See Hearings on S. 510, at 188-89, 208-09. Whether the professional had
such a great advantage is debatable. The amateur could also short tender if his
credit was equal to that of the professional. In addition, the professional who short
tendered was legally obligated to deliver the number of shares tendered. If he did
not correctly estimate the number of shares to be accepted, he could suffer a sub-
stantial loss. See O'Boyle 870. In practice, however, professionals were able to
have more of their shares accepted than amateurs.
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to be a "manipulative or deceptive device."" Consequently, many
large stockholders may now sell in the open market rather than risk
proration.
Although arbitrageurs also may no longer short tender, they
continue to be in a unique position to assume the risk that target
holders are often unwilling to take. An arbitrageur accounts for the
risk that less than all shares which he tenders will be accepted by ad-
justing downward the prices he will pay for target shares. For ex-
ample, assume the target shares are selling at 30, an offer is made at
40, and the arbitrageur believes that after the offer the price of the
target will drop back to 30. If the arbitrageur estimates that 80
percent of his stock will be taken up, his calculations would be as
follows (for each 100 shares of the target which he tenders) : for the
80 percent taken up at 40, he will receive $3200; for the remaining
20 percent, which will be sold on the market at about 30, he will receive
$600; he will thus receive a total of $3800. To insure the profit
necessary to realize the desired rate of return, he may therefore pay
only 36Y2, for target shares. If he could be assured that all of his
stock will be accepted at 40, he might pay as much as 38 for target
shares. Thus as a result of rule 10b-4," in cases where pro rata
acceptance is a factor, the spread remains wider because the arbitrageur
will not pay as much for target shares. The investor is compensating
the arbitrageur for assuming the risk of pro rata acceptance which he
is unwilling to take.
By buying from target shareholders, the arbitrageur arguably
helps to maintain investor confidence in the integrity of the market.
The arbitrageur alleviates the confusion arising from the investor's
inability to predict an offer's outcome; the selling pressure caused by
uncertainty is absorbed by the arbitrageur's buying power. Absent
this buying power, an investor might conclude that the securities market
does not afford him a reasonable number of equally attractive alterna-
tives by which to effectuate his investment decisions. For the more
sophisticated investor, the presence or absence of the arbitrageur, as re-
flected in the price action of the stocks involved, will indicate the
professionals' opinion regarding the outcome of the offer. This in-
vestor will therefore be able to make his decision with some assurance
of its consequences.
Finally, the arbitrageur also accumulates large blocks of target
stock which he will ultimately tender to the offeror. If the offer is
successfully completed, his activities will have substantially facilitated
the distribution of the offered securities. It should be emphasized,
however, that the arbitrageur does not determine the outcome of the
37 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1970).
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offer, but rather evaluates its probable success and concludes that he
can make a profit. The outcome of the offer is determined by external
factors such as shareholder, management, or government reaction and
general market conditions. The arbitrageur simply takes a risk in
hopes of making a profit,"8 and is thus no different from any other
investor except that he operates on a larger scale and with greater
awareness of the risks involved.
III. ARBITRAGE AND THE 1933 ACT
Arbitrageurs generally commence their buying and short selling
operations as soon as a registration statement is filed with the SEC.
An arbitrageur's short selling of the offeror's securities at this time
does not violate section 5(a) of the 1933 Act 3 because the securities
traded are not the offered securities, but other securities of the same
class; the filing of a registration statement for a public offering of
additional securities of an already outstanding class does not require
independent dealers to stop their trading activities in the outstanding
securities.40
But if the arbitrageur covers short sales made prior to the effective
date of the registration statement with registered shares received in
the exchange, one might argue that he was in fact selling the newly
registered securities. Some arbitrageurs attempt to guard against this
danger by covering their short positions just after the effective date
of the registration statement with "old" securities. After remaining at
the risk of the market for about a day, they put out another short.
The previously effected short sales are thereby covered with already
outstanding securities of the offeror, not with the registered securities
received in the exchange. Because the later short sales occur after the
registration statement is effective, they may be covered with new
securities without violating section 5 (a).
Because the arbitrageur waits until after the registration statement
is effective, some doubt arises as to whether the arbitrageur actually
does cover his short position with already outstanding securities. It
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the arbitrageur to cover his
short position in the market before the registration statement becomes
effective. When he is able to cover his short position after the regis-
tration statement becomes effective and some of the newly offered
38 5ee O'Boyle 865.
3915 U.S.C. §77e(a) (1964).
40 1 L. Loss, SEcuRTiEs REGULATION 259 (2d ed. 1961). Where the offered
security is a convertible security, the arbitrageur may short the common stock
underlying the convertible security rather than the security itself. Arbitrageurs will
often do this if it is difficult to borrow the convertible security for the short sale.
See Feast for the Arbitrageurs 166.
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securities have reached the market, many of the securities used to
cover may be the new securities. If in fact some of the securities used
to cover can be traced to the registration statement,41 the arbitrageur
has violated section 5(a) by effecting a sale of a registered security
prior to the effective date of the registration statement.
Even assuming that the arbitrageur covers all short sales with
securities that cannot be traced to the registration statement, it never-
theless appears that such a temporary change of position by the
arbitrageur violates the spirit of the registration requirements. But
under the present system of disclosure in the 1933 Act, it cannot be
so considered. The Act requires full informational disclosure through
a registration statement for an offering of additional securities of an
outstanding class-previously the subject of a registration statement-
and that the purchaser of a "new" registered security be given the
information, while the purchaser of an "old" outstanding security need
be given none. Thus if the arbitrageur can complete his sales with
presently outstanding securities, he will violate none of the require-
ments of the 1933 Act.4
IV. RuLE 10b-6
Rule lOb-6 prohibits an issuer, underwriter, or participating dealer
from bidding for or purchasing any security which is the subject of a
distribution. Also within the rule's prohibition are bids for, or pur-
chases of, any security of the same class or series, or any right to
purchase a security which is the subject of a distribution.43  The rule
is intended to prevent the practice of artificially raising or supporting
the price of a security to increase the return from the offering.44
Whether rule lOb-6 applies to purchases of target securities during
exchange offers was, until recently, the subject of some doubt.45 The
Second Circuit, however, held in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor
Punta Corp.4" that Bangor Punta (the offeror) violated rule lOb-6
41 See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
4 2Arbitrageurs would seem to be subject to the 40-day posteffective prospectus
delivery requirements for sales of the registered securities. The Wheat Report,
however, found that this requirement is generally ignored in regular public offerings.
SEC DisCOsuRE STUDY GROUP, DIscLosURE TO INvEsTORs-A REAPPRAISAL OF
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS '121-22 (1969).
It is doubtful that these requirements are observed any more faithfully in exchange
offers.
43 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-6(a) (1970).
44See Foshay, Market Activities of Participants in Securities Distributions,
45 VA. L. REv. 907 (1959); Whitney, Ride 10b-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered
Rule, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 567 (1964); Comment, The SEC's Rule lob-6: Preserving
a Competitive Market During Distributions, 1967 Durr L.J. 809.
45 Ismm DIscLosuRE PROBLEms 553-54.
46 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. • 92,510 (2d Cir. 1969),
aff'd on rehearing, 426 F2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en bane), affg 303 F. Supp. 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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by purchasing Piper Aircraft (the target) stock in the open market
after announcing an exchange offer to Piper shareholders. The court
reasoned that because rule lOb-6 prohibits purchases of "any right to
purchase any such security" as well as purchases of the security to be
distributed, and because target stock carries the right to purchase the
offeror's securities, 47 purchases of target stock by the specified persons
are prohibited.
Bangor Punta argued that purchases of Piper stock decreased the
offer's chance of success because they raised the price of Piper stock
(thereby decreasing the price differential between the two stocks) and
made the offer appear less attractive.48 Indeed, the purchase of target
stock has been considered a standard defense tactic against an ex-
change offer. Purchases of target stock, it was thus asserted,4" have
an effect opposite to that which rule lOb-6 seeks to prevent and there-
fore should not be viewed as a violation of that rule. The court replied
that this contention
overlooks the decided benefits that purchases of target com-
pany stock can produce for the initiator of an exchange offer.
• . . Small investors especially would be likely to assume that
the exchange offer was receiving serious attention and ap-
probation from larger, more knowledgeable investors than
they. . . . Absent some indication to the contrary, the target
company shareholders would be likely to assume that the
entire increase resulted from the offer, not from cash pur-
chases in addition to the offer. °
But the court did not explicitly state what the "decided benefits"
to the offeror were. The court probably thought the rise in price of
target stock would induce the target shareholders to tender their
shares. Although a price rise in the target stock is often an indication
of the arbitrageur's interest and thus of the likelihood that the exchange
offer will be successful, the probability that small investors, for whom
the court expressed concern, are aware of this is certainly suspect.
It is more likely that only more sophisticated investors would interpret
the price rise in this way.
A rise in price of target stock might also induce target share-
holders who would not otherwise relinquish their holdings to sell on the
open market. Indeed, it was this possibility which in part led to rule
47 But see Lowenfels, Rule 10b-13, Rule 10b-6 and Purchases of Target Company
Securities During an Exchange Offer, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1392, 1398-99 (1969)
(maintaining that this "'right to purchase' is really in the nature of a mere expecta-
tion" when the offer is conditioned on the receipt of a minimum number of shares).
48 See generally INsiDER DIscLosuRE PROBLEMS 553-54.
49 426 F.2d at 577.
50 Id.
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10b-13.51 Although publicly announced, this rule was not yet effective
at the time the purchases in issue in Chris-Craft were made. Rule
10b-13 prohibits the offeror in either a cash or exchange offer from
purchasing target company securities otherwise than pursuant to the
tender offer. The release accompanying publication of the new rule
states that open market purchases may be manipulative because they
"further the tender offer by raising the market price to the point where
ordinary investors sell in the market to arbitrageurs, who in turn
tender." -2 It is unlikely, however, that the court considered this
possibility when it spoke of the "decided benefits" accruing to the
offeror from purchases of target stock on the open market, although
it did refer to the proposed rule.
Chris-Craft has been criticized for its cavalier treatment of the
language and policy of rule 10b-6.53 The court itself conceded that it
could not find, and the SEC could not present, any precedent for its
interpretation of the rule. 4 Despite these problems, it will be assumed
herein that Chris-Craft's interpretation of rule 10b-6, although perhaps
incorrect, is nevertheless the law. But it will be argued that rule 10b-6
does not apply to arbitrageurs.
While rule 10b-13 is by its terms restricted to purchases of a
target security by the offeror,55 rule 10b-6 covers a wider class of
individuals. The extension of the latter rule by the Second Circuit in
Chris-Craft to purchases of target securities during an exchange offer
raises the issue whether it applies to arbitrageurs.
To be within the prohibition of the rule, one must be an "under-
writer," a "prospective underwriter," or a "broker, dealer, or other
person who has agreed to participate or is participating" in a dis-
tribution. An "underwriter," for purposes of rule 10b-6, is one who
has "agreed" with an issuer or other person to distribute securities.5
The definition of "prospective underwriter" requires the existence of an
agreement to submit a bid or an understanding with an issuer that he
may become an underwriter.57 Thus if the arbitrageur remains totally
independent, and makes no commitment or understanding with the
offeror, it is difficult to bring him within either of these two classes
of persons.58 But as the termination of the offer approaches, the
51 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969), in [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP. 77,745.
2 Id.
0 See Lowenfels, supra note 47, at 1406.
54426 F.2d at 576-77.
5517 C.F.R. §240.lob-13(a) (1970).
66 Id. § 240.10b-6 (c) (1).
57 Id. § 240.10b-6(c) (2).
n~ Cf. O'Boyle, supra note 5, at 866.
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arbitrageur will often cease his arbitrage operations and sign a soliciting
dealer's agreement in order to receive the commission on shares ten-
dered to the offeror. He may arbitrage until the last day of the offer,
sign the agreement, and tender immediately; or he may stop arbitraging
sometime before the offer expires and actually engage in soliciting
activities before he tenders. Once he signs the dealer's agreement, he
becomes a participating broker-dealer and is clearly within the pro-
hibition of the rule; " additional arbitrage would thus be prohibited.
Whether the arbitrageur could be found to be a "person who
has agreed to participate or is participating" in a distribution poses a
more difficult question. The very nature and effect of the arbitrageur's
activities may make him a participant, whether or not he signs a
dealer's agreement. This theory is becoming increasingly important
because some arbitrageurs are now reconsidering whether to continue
to engage in the practice of signing a dealer's agreement."0 The theory
rests on a broad reading of the "is participating" language of 10b-6.
Because of the arbitrageur's substantial short sales of the offered secu-
rity, the theory goes, he is assisting the distribution of the offeror's
securities and performing a function which, although not similar in
practice, is at least equivalent in its effects to that of a soliciting dealer.
Such an interpretation, however, is unsupported by the language of the
rule. Moreover, identification of the arbitrageur with the interests of
the offeror in a takeover attempt rests, as will be shown, on a mis-
conception of his goals and the function he serves in the market.
In its most commonly used sense, a "participant" in a distribution
is one who has made an agreement to in some way aid in the distribu-
tion. Although a formal agreement need not exist, some nexus with
59 Rule lOb-6(a) (3) contains 11 specific exceptions to the coverage of the rule.
The exercise of a right to acquire a security is one such exception; this enables the
arbitrageur to tender the target shares he holds in his own name.
60 The arbitrageur's reluctance to continue signing the agreement appears to be
based on the belief that the SEC disapproves of the practice. Arbitrageurs, however,
continue to claim the soliciting fee for their own shares and those of their customers.
This fee can be a large element of the arbitrageur's profits and may enable him to
exceed the market price of the offer in his purchases of target. If a cash offer is
made at $17.50, and the soliciting dealer's fee is $.80 per share, the arbitrageur can
pay over $17.50 for target shares and his profit will consist solely of the $.80
commission.
Former Chairman Cohen and General Counsel Loomis thought it was discrimina-
tory that professionals can get the commission for shares they tender from their
own accounts, thus in effect commanding a higher price than private investors.
Hearings on S. 510, at 199 (statement of Chairman Cohen), 209 (statement of
General Counsel Loomis).
It has been suggested that the arbitrageur's expectation that he might eventually
sign the dealer's agreement makes him a "participant" in the distribution at some
earlier date, thus making all target purchases subsequent to that date violative of
rule lOb-6. But for the same reasons that an arbitrageur who never signs an agree-
ment should not be deemed a participant, see text accompanying notes 61-71 infra,
if an arbitrageur has no understandings with, and engages in no activities on behalf
of offerors, the mere expectancy that the dealer's agreement may be signed should
not be enough to make him a participant in the distribution.
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those comprising the distributing group should be required. Suggest-
ing that mere coincidence of interest with the offeror provides this
essential nexus distorts the common understanding of "participant."
Neither the SEC nor the courts have been called upon to construe
the phrase "a person who . . . is participating." Although the Com-
mission in Shearson, Hammill & Co."' did find a dealer to be an
underwriter within the meaning of rule lOb-6, the nature of the dealer's
activities and the closeness of his relationship with the issuer indicated
that he was affirmatively promoting and assisting the issuer's distribu-
tion. The Commission reached its conclusion even though the regis-
trant's New York office refused to underwrite the offering, no formal
agreement was entered into, and no underwriting fees were paid. The
Commission found that one of the issuer's directors was a partner in
the registrant; that he worked closely with the issuer during the dis-
tribution; that the registrant's facilities were used to carry out the dis-
tribution; and that a large number of shares were sold to the registrant's
customers and partners. There was, in short, a close working re-
lationship between the issuer and the dealer, and their efforts were
coordinated to insure the smooth completion of the distribution.
The kind of relationship which existed between the issuer and
dealer in Shearson, Hammill will rarely be found between an offeror
and arbitrageur. Arbitrageurs assert that they never arbitrage an
offer if they have an investment banking relationship with either party.
They take a position in an offer solely for their own profit-the
offeror's success is not necessarily essential to the realization of that
objective. As long as the spread narrows, arbitrageurs can make
substantial profits simply by establishing a position and reversing it.
The arbitrageur is, of course, most interested in seeing the offer suc-
cessfully completed. He has accumulated a substantial short position
which he will generally be unable to cover other than through the
receipt of the offeror's securities in the exchange. If the takeover
begins to look doubtful, the arbitrageur can reverse his position (and
if he acted quickly enough he may have saved some of his profits);
or, more likely, he can maintain his positions in the hope that the offer
will eventually go through. The mere fact that the arbitrageur's in-
terests coincide with those of the offeror and that he may maintain his
position even when the prospects are dim reflects the arbitrageur's
prediction of the fate of the offer, not a purpose to make it succeed.
Further, arbitrageurs who accumulate a long position in target
shares with the expectation of tendering them to the offeror have
occasionally found that they can get a better deal from someone else,
61 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov. 12, 1965), in [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff77,306.
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as they did in the Crane Company's attempted takeover of Westing-
house Air Brake (WABCO). After being rebuffed by WABCO in
an effort to institute friendly merger discussions, Crane determined to
make a hostile exchange offer to gain control of WABCO. On April
8. 1968 it announced that it would exchange debentures worth $50
for each share of WABCO. Sometime earlier WABCO announced
a defensive merger into American Standard. On April 19, originally
announced as the last day of Crane's exchange offer, WABCO opened
at $42.25, and American Standard purchased for cash in the market
about 170,000 WABCO shares at an average price of $49.50 and im-
mediately sold most of them to friendly mutual funds at an apparent
loss of half a million dollars.' Realizing that arbitrageurs would
determine the outcome of Crane's offer, American Standard made what
it believed was a more attractive offer-approximately $50 in cash.
The demand from cash purchasers . . . . proved much
more attractive to the arbitraguers, who thus could sell
Westinghouse Air Brake and realize cash profits immedi-
ately. This also serves another purpose that doesn't escape
market observers: It effectively dislodges from arbitrageurs
a large amount of Wabco stock that otherwise would have
been tendered to Crane but instead now has been bought by
American Standard and friendly interests.
Crane might have won the battle for control of WABCO had it chosen
to sweeten its offer enough to prevent arbitrageurs from selling Ameri-
can Standard. The trading activities that occurred in connection with
this control contest indicate that the effect of arbitrage is not always
to facilitate the offeror's takeover.
Yet arbitrageurs might still be brought within the expansive read-
ing of the "is participating" language of rule 10b-6. For example,
arbitrageurs' assertions of complete independence must be viewed in
light of the realities of the Wall Street community. Although
arbitrageurs may avoid the obvious kind of relationship found in
Shearson, Haminill, more subtle ties in the financial world might pose
an equally serious problem. Shearson, Hammill should stand as an
obvious warning to arbitrageurs in this respect.
In addition, arbitrageurs may lose some of the independence sep-
arating them from the reach of rule 10b-6 if they claim an exemption
from rule 10a-1.' Rule 10a-1 proscribes various pricing restrictions
62 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 1969).
63 Heard on the Street, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1968, at 33, cols. 3-4.
6417 C.F.R. § 240.!0a-1 (1970).
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on the making of short sales, but specifically exempts certain arbitrage
transactions.' The arbitrage exemption, however, provides that the
sale for which the exemption is claimed or its offsetting purchase must
be "effected for the bona fide purpose of profiting from a current differ-
ence between the price of the security sold and the security owned." 66
An arbitrageur claiming this exemption is compelled to cover his short
position with securities received in the exchange. He has thus lost
the independence that permits him to sell to a third party as was done
in the WABCO fight.
Assuming, however, completely independent arbitrage, contrasting
the opinion in Chris-Craft to that of Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co." illustrates still another reason why the extension of rule
lOb-6 to arbitrageurs would be inappropriate: the difficulty of deter-
mining what constitutes a manipulative or deceptive practice in the
context of a takeover. In Crane, the court intimated that American
Standard's market activities were a fraud and deceit on WABCO
shareholders:
The net result of this buying was to represent to the public,
whose primary source of information is the tape, that there
was a great demand for Air Brake at an increased value. It
is reasonable to conclude that many Air Brake stockholders
who might otherwise have chosen to tender to Crane chose
not to do so because their own holdings in Air Brake looked
better as the price went up.6"
The assumption about market behavior upon which liability to
WABCO shareholders might be based is directly contrary to that made
by the same court in Chris-Craft. The market activities in Chris-Craft
were thought to be potentially deceptive to target holders apparently
because they would induce them to tender. These two cases thus
present the conflicting positions that it is deceptive for an offeror to
raise the price of the target security because it increases the chances that
his offer will succeed, and that it is deceptive for a competing suitor to
raise the price of the target stock because that would deter shareholders
from tendering, thereby increasing the chances that the offer will fail.
The basic assumption made in Crane-that as the price of the
target rises the offer looks less attractive-is supported by well-
established "laws" governing the relationship between the price move-
0:5 Id. § 240.10a-1 (d) (7). See generally E. WEiss, REGISTRATION & REGULkTION
OF BROKERS & DEALERs 160-61 (1965).
66 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (d) (7) (1970).
67419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
68 Id. at 792-93.
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ments of a security and its equivalent. The price of an "exchangeable"
security, such as a convertible debenture, will change if the price of its
equivalent (in this case common stock) changes."' Thus as the price
of the common goes up, the conversion feature of the convertible secu-
rity increases in value, and buying pressure will push the security's
price upward. For this reason, paragraph (b) of rule lOb-6 provides
that a distribution of a security convertible into another security shall
be deemed to include a distribution of the other security.70 On the
other hand, an increase in the price of an "exchangeable" security will
never cause an increase in the price of its equivalent. In the context
of an exchange offer, a rise in the price of the target stock will not
affect the price of the offeror stock. Thus as the target stock rises,
the premium to target shareholders decreases. If rule lOb-6 is
directed against purchases tending to facilitate the distribution of the
offered security by artificially raising its price, it is difficult to conceive
how purchases of target stock can further this prohibited objective.
But although purchases of target shares may raise the price of the
target stock, thereby deterring shareholders from tendering, the price
rise may induce some target shareholders to sell in the open market.
The arbitrageur will buy and in all likelihood tender, increasing the
chances that the offer will be successful. Issuer-induced price rises
might stimulate sales to the arbitrageur in situations where the
arbitrageur himself may not have been willing to undertake the risks.
The manipulative potential of issuer purchases lies in this ability to act
as an artificial substitute for, or a boost to, arbitrageur purchases. The
issuer in this way may overcome by his own actions the uncertainties
and doubts about the merits of the offer which had prevented the
arbitrageur from committing his capital to the offer.
Although purchases of target stock by arbitrageurs has the same
effect as do purchases by the issuer, they are not artificial or manipula-
tive. Rather, they represent the professional judgment of the free and
competitive market as to whether the offer will be successful. Arbi-
trageurs may stay out of the market, they may be cautiously active,
or they may be quite active. Issuer purchases, on the other hand,
represent an artificial factor intruding into this competitive bidding
process which rule 1Ob-6 seeks to preserve. Thus although the ap-
plication in Chris-Craft of rule lOb-6 to purchases of target stock by
69 See EVANs, supra note 6, at 111. See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 40, at 1596
n.121; Comment, supra note 44, at 831 ("[A]ny enhancement of a junior security
tends to make the senior security more appealing . . ").
To The SEC relied on paragraph (b) of rule 10b-6 in its brief in the Chris-Craft
case in addition to its reliance on the "right to acquire" language. Brief for SEC
as Amicus Curiae, Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F2d 569
(2d Cir. 1970). It is clear, however, that the offeror's stock is not convertible into
target stock. See Lowenfels, supra note 47, at 1399.
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the offeror may well be justified," it would be a mistake to extend it
to purchases of target stock by an arbitrageur.
CONCLUSION
Arbitrage provides an attractive alternative to target shareholders
who may not wish to subject their investment to the uncertainties
arising in a tender offer situation. The constant pressure on prices
resulting from the activities of arbitrageurs also tends to stabilize the
relationship of the two securities involved. Finally, the arbitrageur
helps to equalize imbalances of supply and demand in two markets and
acts as an efficient intermediary in the transference of supply and
demand between markets. In performing these functions the arbi-
trageur incurs a risk, and he expects a profit commensurate with the
risk. To the extent that arbitrage of takeovers becomes too costly, the
arbitrageur may well devote more of his time to the routine but prof-
itable riskless arbitrage in outstanding securities.
Each new regulation of takeovers raises the arbitrageur's costs.
Thus far the arbitrageur has been able to pass these costs on to the
public. Rule lOb-4, for example, increases the risk that the arbitrageur
will be prorated. The arbitrageur passes on the cost of this risk by
paying less for target shares. Similarly, if the arbitrageur no longer
signs a dealer's agreement, he will also make up the lost commission
by paying less for target shares. On balance it would seem that these
regulations have not imposed a cost disproportionate to the benefit they
assure in terms of fair dealing and complete independence of the
arbitrageur. But an indiscriminate extension of rule 10b-6 to arbi-
trageurs would impose a cost too great to be passed on to the public
and one uncompensated for by any real public benefit. Such a regu-
lation would most likely eliminate the arbitrageur as an intermediary
in transfers of corporate control, a result hardly warranted merely
because arbitrageurs appear to hold the key to the success of many
takeovers. Abuses of the sensitive position occupied by the arbitrageur
can and should be dealt with through a case-by-case application of
rule 10b-6, similar to that followed in Shearson, Hammill.
71 Chris-Craft and rule 10b-13 are also independently justifiable on the ground
"that all stockholders of the target company in an exchange offer must be treated
alike; that no large blocks may be purchased for one type or amount of consideration
while other stockholders receive another type or amount of consideration." Lowenfels,
supra note 47, at 1407.
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